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Competition.' Such a basic concept: ideas in conflict produce
better products, better music, better literature, better artwork, better
political systems, and so on and so forth. In short, conflict creates a
stronger, more enlightened society continually evolving and increasing
standards of living into perpetuity.2 Moreover, unfettered competition is
the essence of freedom; concentrations of power, whether economic or
political, lead to tyranny and oppression.3 From Adam Smith's invisible
hand4 to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' marketplace of ideas, 5
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director of the Chicago-area research and development firm Scroll Laboratories, Inc.
1. For definitions of competition, see WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE
AMERICAN LANGUAGE (College ed. 1968) (defining "competition" as "striving for the
same object, position, prize ... usually in accordance with certain fixed rules") and
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 278-79 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "perfect competition" as "a
completely efficient market situation characterized by numerous buyers and sellers, a
homogeneous product, perfect information for all parties, and complete freedom to move
in and out of the market. Perfect competition rarely if ever exists, but antitrust scholars
often use the theory as a standard for measuring market performance.").
2. For a robust discussion and analysis of the history of competition theory in the
United States, see generally RUDOLPH J. R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA
(1996).
3. Id. at 3-8.
4. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
5. [T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market .... I think that we should be eternally vigilant
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe
to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate
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competition theory is the foundation of our modem society. 6 Upon that
foundation, global trade has generally been recognized as building
increased choice, more efficient production, and still greater wealth.7
The rather obvious corollary proposition is that in order for international
trade to act as the lever, helping to ratchet up global living standards, full
and free competition must prevail. Inconsistencies, however, arise in
attempts to specifically define competition from one country to the next.
This issue is especially problematic with respect to the implementation of
laws prohibiting anticompetitive behavior; if the contours of competition
are not clearly understood by business people and their lawyers,
anticompetitive behavior is harder to determine ex ante. Therefore,
transnational deal-making and, consequently, growth is incapable of
occurring at optimal levels.
In the international trade arena, understanding the application of
competition laws can become complicated by the specific and nuanced
goals of the particular governments. For example, at first blush EU
competition laws and U.S. antitrust laws both appear to be aimed at
increasing consumer welfare. Economists or attorneys practicing in the
area of antitrust law 8 might explain that both laws are designed to
prevent firms from obtaining monopoly power9 and, therefore, abusing
their market positions by preventing full and free competition,'
l
increasing the social and economic costs to consumers,1" and wielding
too much political clout. 2 The rub, however, lies in the modern
interpretation of the respective laws and in the "social, political, and
market integration" policies underlying the need for such legislation.' 3 It
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate
check is required to save the country.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting).
6. See PERITZ, supra note 2, at 15.
7. See generally Sungjoon Choo, Breaking the Barrier Between Regionalism and
Multilateralism: A New Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 419
(2001); see RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THEORY & PRACTICE 1-6 (2d ed.
2001).
8. Legal concepts of monopoly power other than those relating to the area of
antitrust or anticompetitive law are outside the scope of this paper, but they also include,
for example, concentrations of political power.
9. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases,
94 HARV. L. REv. 937 (1981).
10. The original language of Senator Sherman's antitrust bill states: "All
arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts or combinations ... made with a view, or
which tend to prevent full and free competition. . . or which tend to advance the price to
the consumer .. . are hereby declared to be against public policy, unlawful, and void."
PERrrz, supra note 2, at 13.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 11.
13. Patrick Thieffry, Antitrust Considerations: The Typical Case of the European
Market, in COUNSELING EMERGING COMPANIES IN GOING INTERNATIONAL 189, 190 (Alan
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follows that these distinctions, whether or not subtle, create distinct
wealth effects both domestically and globally. Taking into account the
increasingly integrated nature of the global economy, the question is
logically raised: which laws are better poised to lay the foundation for
more consistent standards governing anticompetitive behavior?
Ostensibly, bridging the gap between the currently divergent
international standards would lead to decreased confusion in the area of
transnational deal-making as well as increased levels of international
growth. 
14
Over the past several decades, U.S. antitrust law has been
dominated by the economics-based, Chicago-school approach to antitrust
policy, which relies heavily on allocative efficiency models and price
theory.15 EU competition law, on the other hand, is less concerned with
the "Kaldor-Hicks, potential Pareto sense of efficiency" 16 than with
factors such as barriers to entry, market integration, fairness, and direct
consumer welfare. 17  When viewed through the lens of total societal
benefit in a more globally integrated marketplace, the EU approach
appears to provide for greater total wealth vis-d-vis the comparatively
limited U.S. approach. First, wealth includes not only income, but also
intangibles such as choice and general standard of living. 18 Second, the
historical and statutory underpinnings as well as the specific policy
objectives of EU and U.S. competition laws demonstrate the EU
approach is more compatible with the modem realities of an increasingly
global marketplace. Third, recent court decisions illuminate the
problems inherent in the application of divergent competition laws and
the relative economic impact. Finally, the application of classic
economic models, such as the Pareto 19 and Kaldor-Hicks20 analysis,
S. Gutterman ed., 1994) (differentiating between the social, political, and market
integration policies underlying EU competition law and U.S. antitrust law).
14. See generally Shanker A. Singham, Market Access and Market Contestibility: Is
the Difference Purely Semantics? A Business Perspective, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 337
(1999); William Sugden, Global Antitrust and the Evolution of an International
Standard, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 989 (2002).
15. See infra Part V(B).
16. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 2 (2d ed. 2001).
17. See infra note 82.
18. See BUALA, supra note 7. For an in-depth discussion of productivity and
standard of living, see Robert J. Gordon, Two Centuries of Economic Growth: Europe
Chasing the American Frontier (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper
No. 10662, Aug. 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl0662.pdf (last visited
Oct. 2, 2005).
19. Policies or transactions which lead to a distribution of resources that increase at
least one person's wealth or utility and decrease no one's wealth or utility are considered
to be "Pareto-superior" allocations or transactions; also referred to as a "Pareto
improvement." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12-13 (6th ed. 2003);
JEFFERY L. HARRISON, LAW & ECONOMICS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND BEHAVIORAL
2005]
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combined with certain aspects of the emerging Post-Chicago school
2'
bolster the proposition that the EU model is better poised to facilitate
greater levels of consumer welfare.
II. Wealth
Before a discussion of the wealth effects of divergent competition
policies and practices may take place, wealth must first be defined.
There are two general concepts of wealth: one narrow and one more
expansive. Because each model contains different values, each one
produces distinct outcomes with respect to wealth creation and growth
when applied to the competition problem.
22
A. The Mercantilist Theory
To the mercantilist and to the neo-mercantilist a nation's wealth lies
in its economic power, end of story.23 Whether this power lies in its
stock of precious metals or in the modem equivalent - its trade surplus -
PERSPECTIVES 50-51 (2002); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying
Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211, 1215 n.14 (1991). The concept of Pareto efficiency
is named for the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923).
20. The Paretian efficiency model more commonly used by economists, namely
Chicago school economists, to determine whether policies or transactions lead to
allocative efficiency is the Kaldor-Hicks or "potential Pareto-superiority" test. Under the
Kaldor-Hicks test a distribution or reallocation which creates gains sufficient to
compensate any losses created by the transaction leads to an efficient outcome; the
compensation, however, is not neccessarily actual, it is merely potential. See POSNER,
supra note 19, at 13-14, HARRISON, supra note 19, at 59-60. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is
named for the LSE trained economists Sir John Hicks (1904-1989) and Nicholas Kaldor
(1908-1986). For more information about Kaldor and Hicks, including Sir John Hicks'
1972 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences shared with Kenneth J. Arrow for "pioneering
contributions to general economic equilibrium theory and welfare theory," see ASSAR
LINDBECK, NOBEL LECTURES, ECONOMICS 1969-1980 (1992), available at
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1972/hicks-autobio.html (last visited Oct. 2,
2005); and The History of Economic Thought Website, Nicholas Kaldor, at
http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/profiles/kaldor.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2005).
21. The Post-Chicago school believes that the market is not necessarily self-
correcting and that market failures are more persistent and frequent than recognized by
the Chicago school. Post-Chicagoans adhere to a more complex assessment of allegedly
uncompetitive practices than do the Chicago school. See Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on
the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REv. 219 (1995). For
example, under Post-Chicago antitrust theory, "[m]arkets that appear competitive-by
virtue, for example, of their relatively large number of small firms-may nevertheless
warrant antitrust scrutiny if information gaps or other imperfections can arguably convey
power on one or more firms." Id. at 247.
22. Purely financial concepts of wealth lead to allocative efficiency models and
policy decisions that vary dramatically from those grounded in a broader view of wealth
that also includes consumer choice, consumption alternatives, and the like.
23. BHALA, supra note 7, at 1-6 (quoting Melvin Krauss, How NATIONS GROW RICH:
THE CASE FOR FREE TRADE, 8-11, 29-32 (1997)).
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the mercantilist views wealth as the ability to invest in foreign assets and
economies combined with the ability to prevent foreigners from
investing in the home economy.2 4 This rather narrow view of wealth
leads to more restrictive policies with respect to growth and trade.25 The
mercantilist is likely to encourage exports via the use of export subsidies
and to discourage imports via the use of import tariffs.26 These measures
in and of themselves lead to monopoly power in the subsidized home
industries and a subsequent decrease in import demand.27 Such policies
are said to "protect" the home economy.28 Under the mercantilist
approach, policies are not hard to envision that also allow firms (as
opposed to industries in general) to establish market power sufficient to
prevent the entry of foreignfirms. The premise would be that as long as
such monopolies can be justified on the grounds of strengthening the
home economy, the downside effects are comparatively irrelevant.29
B. The Classical Theory
While economic viability is certainly one aspect of a nation's
wealth, the classical and neo-classical view 30 is that wealth encompasses
much more. It is the standard of living of the whole of the nation's
citizens.31 It is choice. It is access to information. It is the availability
of consumption alternatives; 32 the ability, if one is so inclined, to walk to
the corner store and to choose from among 200 different types of




27. Id. at 633 (quoting CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT STUDY GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE, Reflections on Regionalism, 11-18 (1997)); however, this type of monopoly
power is outside the scope of this paper.
28. See id. at 517-27 (quoting Congressional Budget Office, The Effects of Import
Quotas on the Steel Industry iii, xv-xix, 39-41, 44-47 (July 1984)).
29. While this statement is merely surmise, other myopic domestic growth policies
have taken root in similarly distorted political soil. In fact, the supply-side economics
policies of the Reagan and Bush I administrations (now resurrected by Pres. George W.
Bush) were cast aside by economists, such as Paul Krugman, as being short on accuracy
and long on politics. "Supply-siders believe that only the supply side matters .... The
history of economic doctrines teaches us that the influence of an idea may have nothing
to do with its quality-that an ideology can attract a devoted following, even come to
control the corridors of power, without a shred of logic or evidence in its favor. Supply-
side economics may have had a meteoric career in the world of politics, but it never did
make any sense." PAUL KRUGMAN, Supply-Side's Silly Season, in THE ACCIDENTAL
THEORIST 47, 48-51 (1997).
30. The founding of the classical approach to growth and trade is generally credited
with the economists Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and John Stuart Mill, among others.
31. See generally SMITH, supra note 4.
32. See BHALA, supra note 7.
33. See generally Economics Focus: Chasing the Leader, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 2003,
2005]
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equate to a high standard of living. In fact, mercantilist motivations (i.e.,
fear of foreign investment and fear of foreign goods entering the stream
of commerce that may eventually lead to a decrease in economic
power 34) lead to policies that in reality decrease a nation's standard of
living.35 The creation of monopoly power in certain sectors via tariffs
and subsidies, under the guise of "strengthening" the nation and
increasing its wealth, actually limits the nation's consumption
alternatives, thereby decreasing overall wealth. The theory that
monopoly power decreases consumption alternatives also applies in most
cases to private sector firm activities controlled by competition law.36
Firms wielding monopoly power are likely to abuse that power 37 by
charging the consumer more than the prevailing market price, producing
mediocre products or services that would otherwise be forced out of the
market by better innovations, decreasing consumer choice as a result of
output restrictions, and the like. The divergent policies of U.S. antitrust
law and EU competition law will be measured throughout this paper by
this view, the classical economist's view that standard of living and
consumption alternatives are what comprise a nation's wealth, not sheer
economic power.38
at 70.
34. Economists such as Melvin Krauss "scoff at these views. Trade policy ...
should be geared to increasing the nation's living standard-not some vague, loosely
defined concept of economic power. What good is increasing the nation's 'power' over
foreign assets if such increase lowers the nation's living standard?" BHALA, supra note 7,
at 4.
35. Id. at 1-4; see generally SMITH, supra note 4.
36. [W]hen a seller produces only a small fraction of the market's total output,
the change in total output brought about by a fractional reduction in his output
is unlikely to be great enough to affect the market price significantly; his power
over price is slight and can be ignored .... [However,] a "monopolist" need
not worry, or at least need not worry as much, if he raises his price above what
a normal competitive price would be ... [that] the other sellers of the product
will expand their output and so drive the price back down. There are no other
sellers. True, the higher price will give firms in other markets an incentive to
enter this one in order to reap the monopoly profits available there. But
presumably entry into the market will take time, so ... the monopolist will
enjoy a significant though not necessarily a permanent power over price.
POSNER, supra note 16, at 10 (emphasis in original). While this sort of Chicago School
analysis of output control underlies U.S. antitrust policy, it is important to note that the
"price" consumers pay for products is not the only determinant of welfare associated with
output. Output is also synonymous with "consumption alternatives" and, therefore,
wealth. When firms wielding monopoly power restrict output to below that demanded by
a competitive market, not only do prices rise, but wealth (by way of fewer consumption
alternatives and reduced consumer choice, in addition to increased capital outflow as a
result of higher prices) also decreases.
37. Assuming that monopoly power is not in and of itself a per se abuse.
38. There are exceptions to the above described use of the terms "consumer welfare
and wealth" (i.e., standard of living, consumer choice, and the like); these are noted in the
[Vol. 24:2
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III. Statutory Purpose: History and Objectives
Whether fear of industrial cartels and the railroad's monopoly
power over the agricultural sector39 or the integration of disparate
economies into a single common market,4 ° the historical underpinnings
and the statutory objectives of the competition laws of the U.S. and the
EU provide a relevant backdrop against which the current competition
problem may be considered.
A. Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act
The Sherman Antitrust Act was born at a time when agriculture still
comprised a major portion of the United States economy, monopoly
power wielded by the railroads were chief concern among farmers, and
the industrial cartels were causing unease in the rest of the population.41
After much debate in Congress,42 the Sherman Act became law on July
2, 189043 by an overwhelming majority in both the House and Senate.
44
Section one of the Act, entitled "Trusts, etc. in restraint of trade
illegal, ' 4S provides in pertinent part: "[e]very contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared
to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed
guilty of a felony.... ,,46 Section two of the Act, entitled "Monopolizing
trade a felony,, 47 provides in pertinent part: "[e]very person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
text and are usually used in the context of the Chicago school approach to antitrust. The
specific meaning the Chicago economists, Bork and Posner in particular, attach to wealth
is not entirely clear. Allocative and productive efficiency, however, are generally key
components. The Chicago definition is found at, RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 12-13 (6th ed. 2003) and ROBERT H. BORK, Business Behavior and the
Consumer Interest, in THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (2d ed.
1993).
39. See George J. Stigler, The Origin of the Sherman Act, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1985).
40. See The Treaty of Rome, infra note 75; see generally Barry E. Hawk, The
American (Anti-Trust) Revolution: Lessons for the EEC, 9 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 53,
54-55 (1988).
41. Stigler, supra note 39.
42. See generally Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman
Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966).
43. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SHERMAN ACT: THE
FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 3 (1991).
44. The House of Representatives voted unanimously in favor of the Act (242 to 0)
and the Senate voted 52 in favor and 1 opposed. Stigler, supra note 39, at 5.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
46. Id.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
20051
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other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a felony.... ,48
There is some debate as to whether the above language was created
from the economic ideology 49 of efficiency or whether it was an attempt
to restrict power and preserve competition.5  In either case,
commentators such as former Yale Law School professor Robert Bork
51
contend that the primary objective of the Sherman Act, and therefore
modem antitrust policy, was the maximization of consumer welfare.52
Moreover, Bork posits, the policy courts were to apply to the antitrust
48. Id.
49. One of the great myths about American antitrust policy is that courts first
began to adopt an "economic approach" to antitrust problems in the relatively
recent past-perhaps as recently as the 1970s. At most, this "revolution" in
antitrust policy represents a change in economic models. Antitrust policy has
been forged by economic ideology since its inception.
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of Competition, 74
IOWA L. REv. 1019, 1019 (1989).
50. Congress in 1890 was concerned about power, not efficiency. The
legislators confronted the concentration crisis from the perspective of an
ideological tradition that equated excessive economic power with political
corruption as well as oppression of competitors and consumers. This tradition
grew out of classical liberal assumptions about the threat to individual liberty
inherent in public and private power.
David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1219,
1292 (1988).
51. Robert Bork taught at the Yale Law School from 1977-1979; he also served on
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia from 1982-1988, and is one of the
founders of the Chicago school approach to antitrust policy. See ROBERT BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978). For more information about Mr. Bork, including
information about his Supreme Court nomination and his involvement in the so-called
Watergate scandal, as well as links to other biographical material, see the Media
Transparency website, http://www.mediatransparency.org/personprofile.php?
personlD=10 (last visited Oct. 2, 2005).
52. "Congress' position with respect to efficiency cannot be explained on any
hypothesis other than consumer welfare was in all cases the controlling value under the
Sherman Act." Bork, supra note 42, at 7. Bork restates the above contention even more
absolutely in THE ANTITRUST PARADOX:
Other commentators appear to think the question of goals essentially
unsolvable, one of those ultimate value choices about which men can never be
expected to agree.... These are positions I wish to dispute. The antitrust
laws ... have only one legitimate goal. . . . (1) The only legitimate goal of
American Antitrust law is the maximization of consumer welfare; therefore,
(2) "Competition," for purposes of antitrust analysis, must be understood as a
term of art signifying any state of affairs in which consumer welfare cannot be
increased by judicial decree.
ROBERT H. BORK, The Goals ofAntitrust: The Intentions of Congress, in THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 50-51 (2d ed. 1993).
The precise definition of consumer welfare maximization used by Bork is not clear,
but based on its contextual use and the vague definition offered at BORtK, supra note 38, it
is closely associated with Posner's definition explained supra note 38.
[Vol. 24:2
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problem was, in modem terms, "the maximization of wealth5 3 or
consumer want satisfaction. 54 What exactly consumer welfare means,
with respect to the core values of the Sherman Antitrust Act, has not
been expressly defined by the federal courts. 5 Using Bork's definitions,
wealth maximization56 or consumer want satisfaction, will help to
identify below some of the shortcomings of the current interpretation of
antitrust law and policy in the United States. Presently, however, the
inquiry is intended to identify whether the thrust of the Sherman
Antitrust Act was aimed at the evils of market inefficiencies or if there
were some other non-economic, social, or political policies involved.
In his article Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act,
57
Bork contends "not once did [Senator] Sherman suggest that the courts
should blunt or discourage efficient size or conduct in the interest of any
social or political value., 58  A careful reading of the Congressional
Record and, indeed, Bork's own references call this contention into
question on two separate grounds. First, with respect to efficient size,
Bork cites inconsistent passages from the Congressional Record to
support his proposition. In the first such passage Senator Sherman is
quoted as recognizing that there might be some utility gained from
allowing, what is referred to in the economics literature as, natural
monopolies59 in certain cases.6 ° In the second such passage, the Senator
53. To the Chicago school of antitrust theory, the Kaldor-Hicks, or potential Pareto
concept of efficiency is synonymous with "wealth maximization." POSNER, supra note
19, at 13; POSNER, supra note 16, at 23.
54. Bork, supra note 42, at 7.
55. Id.
56. See supra note 53.
57. Bork, supra note 42.
58. Id.
59. Natural monopolies exist when the natural ebbs and flows of the market produce
only one firm to serve the entire market. HARRISON, supra note 19, at 554. The common
example of a regulated natural monopoly that benefits society, in addition to certain
utilities services, is the railroad. Id. at 557. The rationale is this:
Railroad[s] ... incur substantial fixed costs. Note that, in this industry, costs
are falling over all relevant ranges of production. This is the essence of a
natural monopoly. .. . [If there were more than one firm [in the railroad
industry,] [c]ompetition would be fierce as the firms lowered prices in order to
achieve lower costs of production and to generate revenue to cover their large
fixed costs. This process would continue until only one firm was left standing.
In a sense, if natural market conditions exist and more than one firm is in the
market, the market will be unstable. When the market evolves to include one
firm, there will be stability.
Id.
60. "When corporations unite merely to extend their business, as connecting lines of
a railway without interfering with competing lines, they are proper and lawful.
Corporations tend to cheapen transportation, lessen the costs of production, and bring
within the reach of millions comforts and luxuries formerly enjoyed by thousands."
Bork, supra note 42, at n.20 (citing 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890)) (emphasis added).
2005]
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identifies monopolistic trusts created on other productive efficiency
grounds as failing to increase consumer welfare. 6' Second, with respect
to Senator Sherman's purported failure to suggest the courts should look
to social or political values when deciding antitrust cases, the following
statement by the Senator is offered: "This bill, as I would have it, has for
its single object to invoke the aid of the courts of the United States .. . in
dealing with combinations that affect injuriously the industrial liberty of
the citizens.... It is the right of every man to work, labor, and produce
in any lawful vocation .... This is industrial liberty and lies at the
foundation of the equality of all rights and privileges.... ,62 Building on
Senator Sherman's ideal of industrial liberty, Senator John P. Jones
couched his opposition to trusts in more overtly political terms by stating
that if trusts were allowed to continue, "our Government is a farce and a
fraud., 63  Senator Sherman believed that "industrial liberty" was "the
foundation of the equality of all rights and privileges." 64 Furthermore,
Sherman believed that "industrial liberty" embodied "entrepreneurial
independence" and that the trust threatened the "small dealers and
worthy men.",65 In one Senate debate over the antitrust issue Sherman
stated, "They had monopolies and mortmains of old, but never before
such giants as in our day. You must heed their appeal or be ready for the
socialist, the communist, and the nihilist. Society is now disturbed by
forces never felt before. 66 To the supporters of the Sherman Act, the
preservation of rough competitive equality was more than an economic
theorem "derived rigorously,, 67 it stood for "political liberty in a free
61. It is sometimes said of these combinations [monopolistic trusts] that they
reduce prices to the consumer by better methods of production, but all
experience shows that this savings of cost goes into the pockets of the producer.
The price to the consumer depends of the supply, which can be reduced at the
pleasure of the combination.
Id. (quoting 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman)).
Senator Sherman describes "productive efficiency" as the economics literature does:
"the ability to produce output at a lower cost per unit," HARRISON, supra note 19, at 41,
not as Bork does: "[Productive] efficiency is one of the two [theories of efficiency] that
enter into the organization of production to meet consumer preferences, and it follows
that antitrust policy cannot be rational unless productive efficiency is understood and
weighed in the law's process. Productive efficiency is any activity by a business firm that
creates wealth." ROBERT H. BORK, Business Behavior and the Consumer Interest, in THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 90, 104-05 (2d ed. 1993) (emphasis
added).
62. PERITZ, supra note 2, at 14 (quoting 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890) (statement of
Sen. Sherman)).
63. Id. at 15.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting 21 CONG. REc. 2460 (1890)).
67. BORK, supra note 52, at 51.
[Vol. 24:2
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society as well."68  Although economics was clearly an essential
component of an antitrust consideration, Bork's syllogism-consumer
welfare is a function of allocative and productive efficiency; 69 consumer
welfare maximization was the sole objective of the Sherman Antitrust
Act;70 therefore, efficiency was the sole objective of the Sherman
Antitrust Act7 '-seems to be derived from a rather nebulous
interpretation of the historical record and context.72 While debate about
the degree to which efficiency was a real influence during the antitrust
debates of 1890 rages on, most commentators agree that preservation of
the classical concept of the free market in the United States was the
primary thrust behind enactment of the Sherman Act.73  In short, the
Sherman Antitrust Act intended to preserve the classical ideal of
competition and in so doing, protect the little guy from the giant guy.
B. Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome
The history and objectives of European Union competition law are
more readily discernible than those of its U.S. counterpart. The
competition laws of the EU are a part of the treaty originally forming the
68. PERITZ, supra note 2, at 15.
69. BoRK, supra note 52, at 104-05.
70. Bork, supra note 42, at 7.
71. BOPK, supra note 52, at 51.
72. From the language of the Sherman Act, its legislative history, and the
history of late nineteenth century America, it is clear that Congress was
concerned about those activities of trusts and monopolies that unduly restrained
trade or caused a monopolization of interstate commerce. ... The legislative
history of the Sherman Act reveals a total lack of concern for allocative
efficiency. ... It is extremely unlikely that the legislators' distaste for
monopoly pricing could have been based upon its impact on allocative
efficiency: the concept of allocative efficiency was, at best, on the verge of
discovery by leading economic theorists when the Sherman Act was passed....
There is [also] little basis for suggesting that the Sherman Act was passed
primarily to improve or even preserve productive efficiency; indeed, the trusts
were viewed as extremely efficient.
Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust:
The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 82-90 (1982).
73. See PERITZ, supra note 2, at 15. See also Lande, supra note 72 (finding that the
Sherman Act was aimed at eliminating the social and political evils associated with trusts
and monopolies such as excessive power and the negative impact on entrepreneurial
liberty and opportunity); Hovenkamp, supra note 49 (arguing that although the original
policy goals of antitrust law are economic, that economic aspect is classical competition
theory, individual self-interest, self-determination, entrepreneurial opportunity, and the
limitation of power); Todd R. Overton, Substantive Distinctions Between United States
Antitrust Law and Competition Policy of the European Community: A Comparative
Analysis of Divergent Policies, 13 Hous. J. INT'L L. 315, 316-17 (1991) (arguing
American antitrust laws were based on the free-market ideal with the ultimate policy goal
of protecting small- to mid-sized businesses).
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European Economic Community 74 and are, therefore, based on the same
general policies; primarily, market integration and consumer welfare.75
74. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts.
85-86, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47-49 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
75. See Preamble to the Treaty of Rome infra Part III(B); see also Consolidated
Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, art. 2, 2002
O.J. (C 325) 33, 40:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an
economic and monetary union and by implementing the common policies or
activities referred to in Articles 3 and 3a, to promote throughout the
Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities,
sustainable and non inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high
degree of convergence of economic performance, a high level of employment
and of social protection, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life,
and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.
Id. art. 2:
1. For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Community shall
include, as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set out
therein:
a. the elimination, as between Member States, of customs duties and
quantitative restrictions on the import and export of goods, and of all
other measures having equivalent effect;
b. a common commercial policy;
c. an internal market characterized by the abolition, as between Member
States, of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services
and capital;
d. measures concerning the entry and movement of persons in the
internal market as provided for in Title IV;
e. a common policy in the sphere of agriculture and fisheries;
f. a common policy in the sphere of transport;
g. a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not
distorted;
h. the approximation of the laws of Member States to the extent required
for the functioning of the common market;
i. the promotion of coordination between employment policies of the
Member States with a view to enhancing their effectiveness by
developing a coordinated strategy for employment;
j. a policy in the social sphere comprising a European Social Fund;
k. the strengthening of economic and social cohesion;
1. a policy in the sphere of the environment;
m. the strengthening of the competitiveness of Community industry;
n. the promotion of research and technological development;
o. encouragement for the establishment and development of trans
European networks;
p. a contribution to the attainment of a high level of health protection;
q. a contribution to education and training of quality and to the flowering
of the cultures of the Member States;
r. a policy in the sphere of development cooperation;
s. the association of the overseas countries and territories in order to
increase trade and promote jointly economic and social development;
t. a contribution to the strengthening of consumer protection;
u. measures in the spheres of energy, civil protection and tourism.
Id. art. 3.
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The Preamble to the Treaty of Rome7 6 clearly defines the purposes
behind the establishment of the European Economic Community:
DETERMINED to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among
the peoples of Europe,
RESOLVED to ensure the economic and social progress of their
countries by common action to eliminate the barriers which divide
Europe,
AFFIRMING as the essential objective of their efforts the constant
improvements of the living and working conditions of their peoples,
RECOGNIZING that the removal of existing obstacles calls for
concerted action in order to guarantee steady expansion, balanced
trade and fair competition,
ANXIOUS to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure
their harmonious development by reducing the differences existing
between the various regions and the backwardness of the less
favoured regions,
DESIRING to contribute, by means of a common commercial policy,
to the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade,
INTENDING to confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and the
overseas countries and desiring to ensure the development of their
prosperity, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the
United Nations,
RESOLVED by thus pooling their resources to preserve and
strengthen peace and liberty, and calling upon the other peoples of
Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts,
HAVE DECIDED to create a EUROPEAN COMMUNITY .... 77
Section 85 of the Treaty of Rome78 provides, in pertinent part: "The
following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market:
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
76. Treaty of Rome, supra note 74, at Preamble.
77. Id.
78. Id. art. 85 (after renumbering, now art. 81).
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restriction or distortion of competition within the common market .. '9
Article 86 provides, in pertinent part: "Any abuse by one or more
undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member
States. .80
Unlike the interpretation of original policies underlying U.S.
antitrust law, the objectives of EU competition law are undisputed and
clearly set forth.81  The primary goals of EU competition law are
integration of the separate economies into the unified common market,
the promotion of free trade, and consumer welfare or fairness.
82
IV. Court Interpretations
A brief consideration of two cases in which U.S. companies
encountered problems in the EU when attempting to complete mergers
will serve to illustrate the application of the divergent policies. First, the
1973 decision in Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Co. v.
Commission ("Continental Can") 83 lays the policy foundation for EU
merger control as a means to promote competition. Second, the
controversial 2001 decision in General Electric/Honeywell v.
Commission84 demonstrates the extent to which the principles outlined in
Continental Can may be applied. These two cases will demonstrate
79. Id. Specific prohibitions include: "directly or indirectly fix[ing] purchase or
selling prices or any other trading conditions," "limit[ing] or control[ling] production,
markets, technical development, or investment," "shar[ing] markets or sources of
supply," "apply[ing] dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage," and"mak[ing] the
conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection
with the subject of such contracts." Id.
80. Id. art. 86 (now art. 82). Specific prohibitions include: "directly or indirectly
impos[ing] unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions,"
"limit[ing] production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers,"
"apply[ing] dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage," and "making the conclusion of
contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which,
by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of
such contracts." Id.
81. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 74, at Preamble. See also id. arts. 2-3.
82. See generally Thieffry, supra note 13. See also Hawk, supra note 40; Overton,
supra note 73; Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization and Dominance in the United States and
the European Community: Efficiency, Opportunity, and Fairness, 61 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 981 (1986).
83. Case 6/72, Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Co. v. Comm'n, 1973
E.C.R. 215 [hereinafter Continental Can].
84. Commission Decision COMP/M.2220, Gen. Elec./Honeywell v. Comm'n, 2004
O.J. (L 48) 1 (EC) [hereinafter GE/Honeywell].
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some of the problems divergent competition standards create when
applied to deals within a global marketplace.
A. Continental Can
The first acquisition case decided by the Court of Justice was
Continental Can.85 In Continental Can, a U.S. firm acquired other firms
specializing in related product lines in what is now the EU.86 The case
raised the issue of "whether an acquisition that increases a dominant
position can ever, for that reason alone, be an abuse of a dominant
position prohibited by Article 86 [of the Treaty of Rome].'
In order to answer the question, the court considered three sub-
issues: 88 (1) the Treaty of Rome does not contain an express merger
control provision; 89 (2) the Treaty of Rome requires an "abuse" or an
"abusive exploitation" as related to buyers or trading partners, not a
change in market structure that increases market power;90 and (3) the
Treaty of Rome implies there must be a causal link connecting the
"dominant position" to the "abuse." 91
The Court of Justice based its decision to strike down the
Continental Can mergers on the following reasoning: if Article 86 did
not apply to mergers, firms could utilize mergers to acquire "such a
dominant position as to virtually remove any serious possibility of
competition, thus, "jeopardiz[ing] the proper functioning of the Common
Market., 92 Therefore, Article 86 does apply to mergers. The Court
further reasoned, a firm could abuse its dominant position if it
"strengthen[ed] that position to the point where the degree of domination
achieved substantially hampers competition, so that only enterprises
which in their market conduct are dependant on the dominant enterprise
would remain on the market., 93 In other words, the Court took a pro-
competition stand in applying Article 86 to merger cases in which one of
the firms already maintains a dominant market position and the merger
would be an abuse of that position via increased market dominance and
the resulting threat to free competition. 94 However, the Treaty does not
seem to address mergers that create a dominant market position.95
85. Fox, supra note 82, at 987.
86. Continental Can, supra note 83.




91. Id. at 987-88.
92. Id. (quoting Continental Can, supra note 83, at 243-44).
93. Id. (citing Continental Can, supra note 83, at 245).
94. See id. at 989-90.
95. Id at 990.
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Perhaps in this respect, EU competition law could bend a bit to
incorporate limited concepts of U.S. antitrust law.
B. GE/Honeywell
On July 3, 2001, the Commission of the European Communities
("Commission") struck down the merger of General Electric Company
("GE") and Honeywell International, Inc. ("Honeywell").96 This was the
first time the Commission blocked a U.S. merger that had already been
approved by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission. 97 The Commission found that "the proposed merger would
lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position on the [EU]
markets for large commercial jet aircraft engines, large regional jet
aircraft engines, corporate jet aircraft engines, avionics and non-avionics
products, as well as small maritime gas turbine, as a result of which
effective competition in the common market would be significantly
impeded., 98 Although, the Commission invoked different enforcement
mechanism to invalidate the merger, 99 the underlying policy objectives
were consistent with those the Court of Justice found in the Continental
Can100 decision and, indeed, with the Treaty of Rome.' 01
V. Impact, in Terms of Wealth
After examining the underlying policy objectives of both the U.S.
antitrust law and EU competition law and how those policies play out in
the courts, it can be seen that slight differences in competition goals can
96. Stefan Schmitz, How Dare They? European Merger Control and the European
Commission's Blocking of the General Electric/Honeywell Merger, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 325, 326 (2002).
97. Id.
98. Yeo Jin Chun, The GE-Honeywell Merger Debacle: The Enforcement of
Antitrust/Competition Laws Across the Atlantic Pond, 15 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 61, 62
(2002) (quoting GE/Honeywell, supra note 84, at 567).
99. While the specific enforcement mechanisms are outside the scope of this paper,
to the extent it is relevant to the underlying policy, the European Merger Control
Regulation (ECMR) test is worth mentioning. The GE/Honeywell merger was struck
down under the two-part ECMR requirement: (1) the dominant position test, and (2) the
significant impediment to competition test. Ostensibly, if the merger passes muster under
the two pronged test, it is "compatible with the Common Market." See generally
Schmitz, supra note 96.
100. See supra Part IV(A).
101. [T]o promote throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced
development of economic activities, sustainable and non inflationary growth
respecting the environment, a high degree of convergence of economic
performance, a high level of employment and of social protection, the raising of
the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and
solidarity among Member States.
See Treaty of Rome, supra note 75, art. 2.
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lead to widely divergent results. When a merger is either approved or
struck down, each country's policy has the potential to influence
dramatically the wealth of the other. In an increasingly global society, a
standard level of certainty is required in order to foster transnational
deal-making. To that end, the potential wealth effects of EU and U.S.
policies will now be considered through the lens of the classical
definition of wealth.102
A. What is the Social Cost?
Monopolies are bad. It would probably be difficult to find much
general disagreement with this exceedingly broad statement. Why,
though, is it that monopolies are, for the sake of consistency, bad?
In 1975, Richard Posner wrote an article for the Journal of Political
Economy, titled The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation.
10 3
Posner identifies two major costs to society; 10 4 deadweight cost'0 5 and
opportunity cost. 10 6 To illustrate the concept, Posner used the analogy of
theft (borrowed from Becker'0 7 and Tullock'0 8). "The transfer of wealth
from victim to thief involves no artificial limitation of output (if a thief
took three radios from a home and on the way out dropped one, which
broke, the resulting loss would correspond to the deadweight loss of
monopoly), 10 9 but it does not follow that the social cost of theft is zero.
The opportunity for such transfers draws resources into thieving and in
turn into protection against theft, and the opportunity costs of the
resources consumed are social costs of theft."' 1°
102. For a discussion of the concepts of wealth see infra Part II.
103. Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL.
ECON. 807 (1975).
104. Id.
105. When market price rises above the competitive level, consumers who
continue to purchase the sellers' product at the new, higher price suffer a loss
exactly offset by the additional revenue that the sellers obtain at the higher
price. Those who stop buying the product suffer a loss not offset by any gain to
the sellers. This is the "deadweight loss" from supracompetitive pricing.
Id.
106. Deadweight loss is not the only social cost associated with monopolies.
Opportunity cost is also a social cost of monopoly. Id. Posner explains that "[tihe
existence of an opportunity to obtain monopoly profits will attract resources into efforts
to obtain monopolies, and the opportunity costs of those resources are social costs of
monopoly too." Id. (citing Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies,
and Theft, WESTERN ECON. J. 5 (1967)).
107. See Gary S. Becker, Crime & Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169 (1968).
108. Tullock, supra note 106.
109. This parenthetical was a footnote in the original text. Posner, supra note 103, at
808 n. 1.
110. Posner, supra note 103, at 807-08 (citing Tullock, supra note 106, and Becker,
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The social costs that Posner describes are analogous to the classical
economists' wealth values.' Deadweight loss creates a general
decrease in standard of living (increased price associated with a lack of
suitable substitutes takes buyers out of the market, thereby restricting
choice), and the opportunity cost associated with diverted resources
creates fewer consumption alternatives (resources taken out of the
production of certain goods in the hope of achieving monopoly profits in
others reduces the total number of different products produced).
B. Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks: What Does the Chicago School Say?
To paint with a very broad brush, the Chicago school approach to
antitrust policy is grounded almost entirely in the concept of efficiency,
or as Posner says, the "potential-Pareto, Kaldor-Hicks" concept of
efficiency. 12  Posner equates Kaldor-Hicks efficiency with "wealth
maximization.""' 3 Bork declares that the sole policy goal of antitrust is
consumer welfare. 114 Consumer welfare, Bork claims, is the same as
productive and allocative efficiency." 5 Is this necessarily true?
One of Posner's hypotheticals might help to clarify his contention.
"A is selling a wood carving to B. A values the woodcarving at $50 and
B at $120, so that at any price between $50 and $120, the transaction
creates a total benefit of $70 (at a price of $100, for example, A
considers himself $50 better off and B considers himself $20 better off) it
is an efficient transaction, provided the harm (if any) to third parties
(minus any benefit to them) does not exceed $70." The transaction
would not be Pareto superior unless A and B actually compensated the
third parties for any harm suffered by them. The Kaldor-Hicks concept
is also suggestively called potential Pareto superiority: The winners
could compensate the losers, whether or not they actually do."' 16 This
Posner calls "wealth maximization."
The concept of wealth maximization embodied in the Kaldor-Hicks
allocative efficiency model is wholly at odds with the Classical concept
of wealth. Kaldor-Hicks does not, as Bork posits, maximize consumer
welfare. Posner's hypothetical used to illustrate Kaldor-Hicks in action
might be acceptable when two guys are bargaining at a craft fair; but in
the world of antitrust, there are countless third parties who are affected
by the dealings of the primary parties. In Posner's hypothetical, it
supra note 107).
111. See supra Part 11.
112. See supra notes 19-20.
113. POSNER, supra note 19, at 13.
114. Bork, supra note 42, at 7.
115. Id.
116. POSNER, supra note 19, at 13.
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appears that everyone is better off because there are only two affected
parties. In a monopolistic consideration, under the Kaldor-Hicks test, if
the primary parties are made sufficiently better off to compensate those
made worse off, even if they do not, it is an efficient transaction and not
a violation of antitrust law.
This test does not take into consideration many of the underlying
values of the Sherman Act such as industrial liberty, entrepreneurial
freedom, and preservation of competition. Nor does this test contemplate
real "consumer welfare" in the Classical sense. There is no consideration
of consumption alternatives, choice, and standard of living. The Kaldor-
Hicks test is more consistent with the mercantilist and neo-mercantilist
concepts of wealth than it is with the Classical view. Instead of
measuring wealth in terms of increased standard of living, Kaldor-Hicks
measures wealth in terms of decreased standard of living that could
potentially be compensated for, but is not.
C. What About the Post-Chicago School?
Paramount among the antitrust concerns of the Post Chicago school
is efficiency. That is where the similarities with the Chicago school
begin to taper off. The Post Chicago school focuses on market
imperfections and the monopoly power that could be exploited therein.
The Post Chicago school identifies these market imperfections and
evaluates information gaps and switching costs for commercial
significance; its belief is that markets are not entirely self correcting. As
stated above, the Post Chicagoans may scrutinize markets which appear
to be competitive by way of a relatively large number of small firms, if
information gaps or other imperfections may potentially grant monopoly
power in one or more firms. Post Chicagoans seek to repair the relevant
market failures or to prevent firms from taking unfair advantage of them.
The increased complexity and cost of this method of enforcement leads
to a "heightened sensitivity to market dynamics and the promotion of
efficiency." The Post Chicago school is in opposition to the Chicago
notion that the markets are self correcting and that allocative efficiency is
wealth maximizing.
VI. Conclusion: The Welfare Bottom Line
Welfare carries with it many meanings: Bork's meaning, 1 7
Webster's Dictionary meaning, 1 8 the Classical economists' meaning, 1 9
117. Bork, supra note 52.
118. The state of being or doing well; condition of health, happiness, and prosperity;
well-being. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE (College
ed. 1968).
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the list goes on and on. In the global marketplace, however, the
maximization of welfare must be interpreted as increased standard of
living.1lz  As noted in the major world trading agreements, 121 this is the
common goal of the world's trading partners. 122  As full and free
competition is crucial to full and free trade, the standards by which it is
regulated must be consistent with the goals of free trade. When the
international standards are inconsistent or vague, ex ante protection
measures become more difficult and are an inefficient diversion of
resources. Furthermore, inconsistent standards can lead to ex post
problems as well.
123
The principles of industrial liberty, entrepreneurial freedom, and
robust competition espoused by Senator Sherman in the early iterations
of his bill and during the floor debates concerning the antitrust bill
bearing his name 124 are consistent with those principles relating to the
standard of living concept expressly set forth in the EU charter.
125
Moreover, the WTO (including former incarnations) and its 146 member
nations agree that the principle goal of international trade is to increase
standards of living across the globe. 126 Transnational deal-making of the
sort regulated by antitrust and competition laws are either the result of
international trade or the creators of international trade, 127 and should,
therefore, be governed by its principles and goals. The Chicago school's
Kaldor-Hicks test for allocative efficiency is wholly at odds with the
119. See supra Part II(B).
120. See CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION (Mar. 24, 1948) (the
ITO charter was created "for the purpose of realizing the aims set forth in the charter of
the United Nations, particularly the attainment of the higher standards of living, full
employment and conditions of economic and social progress and development ... )
(emphasis added); THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (Oct. 30, 1947)
(the preamble states "Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic
endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective
demand... ) (emphasis added); URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION (Apr. 15, 1994) (Recognizing that their relations in the field of
trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of
living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income
and effective demand... ) (emphasis added).
121. Id.
122. As of October 1, 2005, the number of WTO members stood at 148; for more
information about the WTO, http://www.wto.org.
123. For a discussion of the consequences of merger activities being approved in one
country and struck down for failure to comply with competition laws in another, see
supra Part IV.
124. See supra notes 72-73. See generally supra Part Ill(A).
125. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 75.
126. See supra note 122.
127. Either because countries trade their firms do business, or firms get together and
conduct business, thereby generating international trade.
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generally accepted principles of international trade. The test only
considers standard of living to the extent that increases are possible,
whether those increases are realized is not important.
It is recognized that at least some level of convergence in the area of
competition law is necessary to foster a more robust level of
transnational deals. 128 However, the move should not be away from the
European standard and toward the Chicago standard if the goal of
international trade is to remain increasing the global standard of living.
While the EU approach may need to incorporate more economic analysis
into its approach, 129 adopting the Chicago standard would be a frightened
retreat to the protectionist economic values of the 18th century
mercantilist; rather than a step toward the shared values of 21st century
global trade economics.
128. See "Convergence "-Antitrust Mantra, 2 POWELL GOLDSTEIN FRAZER &
MURPHY ANTITRUST BULLETIN (Dec. 2002).
129. Id.
20051

